Service of Process Through Social Media in Mississippi by Henderson, Anna Claire
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 38 
Issue 3 Vol. 38 Iss. 3 Article 3 
2020 
Service of Process Through Social Media in Mississippi 
Anna Claire Henderson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henderson, Anna Claire (2020) "Service of Process Through Social Media in Mississippi," Mississippi 
College Law Review: Vol. 38 : Iss. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss3/3 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
 
312 
SERVICE OF PROCESS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA IN MISSISSIPPI 
 




 “Now and then an extraordinary case may turn up, but 
constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some 
chances, and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will be 
done.”1 Rather than being an extraordinary case, it is relatively common 
to have a case where the location of a defendant, nonresident or resident 
of the state, is unknown and service proves to be more difficult.2 With the 
Supreme Court setting the standard for the constitutionality of notice in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Co.,3 courts have been given more 
freedom to accept newly-proposed methods of service that would meet the 
constitutional requirements,4 provided that the method is accepted and 
proscribed by statute.5  With advances in technology, internet, and 81% of 
the United States population being active on some form of a social media 
account,6 it is evident that Americans are in a different era where service 
by “notice on a courthouse door or in a newspaper” by publication are no 
longer the most pragmatic means to notify a defendant who cannot be 
located to be served process.7  
For example, in Noble v. Noble, the wife attempted to serve her 
husband in a divorce action through notice by “nonresident publication in 
 
    * J.D., Class of 2020, Mississippi College School of Law. Thank you to Law 
Review at Mississippi College School of Law for editing and presenting this work, 
“Service of Process Through Social Media in Mississippi,” in Spring 2020. This author 
would also like to thank Dean Deborah Challener for her guidance in choosing the topic, 
advising, and editing throughout the drafting process. 
    1. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) 
(citing Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911)). 
    2. See generally Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317 (Miss. 1987).   
    3. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
    4. See Trisha Dowerah Baruah, Effectiveness of Social Media as a tool of 
communication and its potential for technology enabled connections: A micro-level 
study, 2 INT’L J. OF SCI. & RES. PUBL’NS 1, 8-9 (2012) (discussing the impact of 
social media on the way people communicate and process information). 
    5. Noble, 502 So. 2d at 319. 
    6. J. Clement, Social Media – Statistics & Facts, 
https://www.statista.com/topics/1164/social-networks/. 
    7. Peter S. Vogel & Sara Ann Brown, U.S. Trial Courts Now Allow Service 
by Facebook and LinkedIn, but Will Appellate Courts Agree?, Soc. Media L. & P. Rep. 
(BNA) 03 SMLR 33, at 789 (Nov. 4, 2014). 
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[a] newspaper.”8  Due to the defendant not being found after a diligent 
inquiry and “the post office address of the defendant [not being] known to 
the plaintiff after diligent inquiry,” service of process by publication was a 
constitutionally permissible method of effecting service upon the 
defendant under Rule 4(c)(4)9 of Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“Miss. R. Civ. P.”) to grant a divorce.10 However, the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi held that service by publication was not an adequate form of 
notice for rendering a “monetary judgment” with the granted divorce.11  
The Court concluded that the adequacy of notice was questionable due to 
the absence of some form of proof of the defendant’s receipt of the 
summons.12 If social media service was allowed under Rule 4(c) as 
another alternative procedural means, then locating and proving the 
defendant’s reception of the summons would become less taxing.  
With advances in communication and technology, it seems that 
service through social media under the right circumstances could be “a 
more pragmatic means by which to serve a missing defendant” than notice 
by publication.13  If Mississippi would adopt a provision giving courts the 
freedom to accept service through social media under certain 
circumstances, it would possibly help alleviate some of the conflicts that 
come with serving defendants who cannot be located or who are evading 
service. 
 
    8. Noble, 502 So. 2d at 317. 
    9. Rule 4(c)(4) states: 
(A) If the defendant in any proceeding in a chancery court, or 
in any proceeding in any other court where process by 
publication is authorized by statute, be shown by sworn 
complaint or sworn petition, or by a filed affidavit, to be a 
nonresident of this state or not to be found therein on diligent 
inquiry and the post office address of such defendant be stated 
in the complaint, petition, or affidavit, or if it be stated in such 
sworn complaint or petition that the post office address of the 
defendant is not known to the plaintiff or petitioner after 
diligent inquiry, or if the affidavit be made by another for the 
plaintiff or petitioner, that such post office address is 
unknown to the affiant after diligent inquiry and he believes it 
is unknown to the plaintiff or petitioner after diligent inquiry 
by the plaintiff or petitioner, the clerk, upon filing the 
complaint or petition, account or other commencement of a 
proceeding, shall promptly prepare and publish a summons to 
the defendant to appear and defend the suit. The summons 
shall be substantially in the form set forth in Form 1-C. 
  10. Noble, 502 So. 2d at 321.  
  11. Id. at 320. 
  12. Id. 
  13. Vogel & Brown, supra note 7, at 789. 
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 This Article exposes a possible solution to the continuing problem 
of serving defendants who are missing or evading service in Mississippi. 
For a new method of service to be introduced, it has to meet the notice 
requirements set out in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
and be authorized by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4. 
This Article proposes an amendment to Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of 
Civil Procedure that would give courts the power to allow alternative 
forms of service, such as service via social media under certain 
circumstances. In addition, this Article outlines the requirements that 
social media service must meet to successfully be considered 
constitutionally sufficient. This Article is not proposing that service of 
process through social media replace all preexisting methods; rather, this 
Article is simply introducing an alternative method to choose from that 
would be more likely to provide defendants with notice under certain 
circumstances. 
 
II. THE HISTORY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “a person shall not be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”14  A 
cause of action is a form of property that is protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution because one has a property interest in the 
lawsuit.15  Under the Due Process Clause, if a court intends to interfere 
with a person’s life, liberty, or property, a defendant must be given “the 
opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly judged, and 
therefore some form of hearing is required before the owner is finally 
deprived of a protected property interest.”16  
In order for a defendant’s due process right to be protected, “due 
process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstance, to 
appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action.”17  The purpose 
of notice is to make a defendant aware of a pending action, so they have 
the opportunity to be heard. Service of process is used to accomplish this 
notice. The method used to notify a defendant of a lawsuit must always be 
constitutional and comply with the applicable state or federal service rules 
of that jurisdiction.18  
 
  14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
  15. Albert v. Allied Glove Corp., 944 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 2006) (citing Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)). 
  16. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
  17. Miss. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Geotes, 770 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 2000). 
    18. Alyssa L. Eisenberg, Comment, Keep Your Facebook Friends Close and 
Your Process Server Closer: The Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases 
Involving Domestic Defendants, 51 San Diego L. Rev. 779, 782 (2014). 
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The sections that follow explore what the standard is for 
determining the constitutionality of different methods of services, as well 
as how this standard developed. The sections will also address the 
possible methods of service of process that meet this constitutional 
standard, and that can be used to provide this important constitutional 
right of notice. In addition, the sections will also explore how these 
methods have evolved over the years due to progress in travel, 
communications, and technological advances. Further, the following 
sections will explore the evolution of service of process through social 
media being used abroad19 and now in certain parts of the United States.20  
 
A. Basic Purpose for Service of Process 
 
The opportunity to be heard is the fundamental requisite for due 
process of law that gives rise to the requirement of notice because the 
right to be heard is worthless unless one is aware that an action is 
pending,21 as well as a need for one to protect their rights to life, liberty, 
and property.22 The basic purpose of service of process is to formally 
assert the court’s authority over the defendant, as well as inform them of 
the pending cause of action so that he or she can prepare to defend it.23 
For a court to enter a binding judgment against a defendant, the defendant 
must be given sufficient notice of the court’s intentions to interfere with 
his liberty or property.24 Service of process is delivering the initial papers 
in the action to the defendant to provide sufficient notice of a pending 
action, so the defendant has the right to decide whether to appear, default, 
acquiesce, or contest.25 
For notice to be considered sufficient, the method of service 
should be authorized by statutory provisions of that jurisdiction and must 
 
  19. See generally St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, No. 3:16-cv-3240-
LB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136152 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2016). Al-Ajmi was a Kuwaiti 
national and efforts to locate him were unsuccessful. St. Francis asked to serve al-Ajmi 
by alternative means under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) via the social-media 
platform, Twitter. 
  20. See generally Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(Plaintiff wife was permitted to serve defendant husband a divorce summons by sending 
a private message through defendant's social media account.). 
  21. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 
(citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).  
  22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
  23. JOSEPH W. GLANNON ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK (3d ed. 
2017). 
  24. GLANNON ET AL, supra note 23, at 328; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 
732-33 (1877). 
  25. GLANNON ET AL, supra note 23, at 328; Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-33.   
316 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 38:3 
be constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.26 
If the method of service of process is not proper due to being 
unconstitutional or failing to comply with the rules of that jurisdiction, 
then the court can dismiss the action or reverse the default judgment.27  
Each state is allowed to determine what manners of service of process are 
sufficient to assert that court’s authority over a defendant, but all methods 
of service must comply with the requirements set out in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.28 For these 
methods of service of process permitted by states to comply with this due 
process law,29 they have to, at a minimum, meet the following 
requirements: (1) notice and (2) opportunity for hearing appropriate for 
the nature of the case.30  
 
B. The Determination of a Method’s Constitutionality 
 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Supreme 
Court expanded the basic constitutional standard for proper notice under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which became known as the “Mullane 
Standard.”31  This case developed the determination of sufficient service 
of process to be through notice that was “reasonably calculated to inform” 
based on the circumstance of the individual case.32 For notice to be 
sufficient under the Constitution, it must be “reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,” as well 
as afford the interested parties a reasonable amount of time to make their 
appearance.33 Even though “personal service of written notice within the 
jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of 
proceeding,”34 it is not always required under the circumstances of certain 
cases.35 Actual notice is not constitutionally required,36 so constructive 
 
  26 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311. 
  27 Rentz v. Swift Transp. Co., 185 F.R.D. 693, 697 (M.D. Ga. 1998). 
  28 Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Service of Process Via Computer or Fax, 
30 A.L.R.6th 413 (2008). 
  29 GLANNON ET AL, supra note 23, at 333. 
  30 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. 
  31 Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Postman Never Rings Twice: The 
Constitutionality of Service of Process by Posting After Green v. Lindsey, 33 Am. U.L. 
Rev. 601 (1984).  
  32 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. 
  33 Id. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)). 
  34 Id. at 313. 
  35 Id. at 319.  
  36 Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 169-170 (2002).  
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forms of notice, also referred to as substitute service, are allowed as long 
as these methods are constitutional under the Mullane Standard.37 
In Mullane, even though notice by publication in a newspaper to 
beneficiaries of a trust was considered a sufficient statutory notice, it was 
not considered the most practicable notice for beneficiaries whose names 
and addresses were available.38 In this case, it was argued that statutory 
notice by newspaper publication was sufficient for beneficiaries whose 
“whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained.”39  But, “the 
statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it 
fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not 
reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by 
other means.”40  It was inadequate because it was not the most appropriate 
or “reasonably calculated” method of service to inform the interested 
parties who “were known present beneficiaries of known place of 
residence.”41  
Reasonableness is the key to the constitutional validity of notice. 
Therefore, it is not a “mere gesture,” but the actual “means employed 
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee” that is 
necessary.42  Any statutory method of notice will be able to claim 
constitutional validity if the method chosen is reasonably certain to inform 
interested parties, and the form chosen is not substantially less likely to 
provide notice than other feasible and customary substitutes.”43  With the 
names and postal addresses of the beneficiaries being accessible, notice by 
newspaper publication was less likely than postal notification to appraise 
the beneficiaries of the pendency of the action.44 
Thus, it is clear that when it is reasonably possible or practicable 
to use a substitute method which would give more adequate warning to 
interested parties than another, then one must always choose the method 
that would appear truly desirous to inform the interested parties.45  In 
cases where defendants are missing or unknown, however, “employment 
of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that 
the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree 
 
  37 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15. 
  38. Id. at 318-19. 
  39. Id. at 317. 
  40. Id. at 319.  
  41. Id. at 313. 
  42. Id. at 315 (citing Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)).  
  43. Id. (citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928)). 
  44. Id. at 318. 
  45. Id. at 317.  
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foreclosing their rights.”46  The court has to look at the circumstances of 
the case to determine whether the interested parties could have been easily 
informed by another means of service, and if so, then the method chosen 
will likely be determined inadequate or insufficient to satisfy the due 
process of law.47  
 
C. Service of Process in Mississippi and Federal Courts 
 
Service of process for the purpose of this article refers to the 
delivery of both the summons and a copy of the complaint together to the 
interested party by someone that is at least eighteen and is not a party to 
the action, which both Mississippi Rule 4 and Federal Rule 4 require.48  
The plaintiff is free to request the court to order the service of the initial 
papers of the lawsuit to be delivered by a U.S. Marshal or another 
specially appointed person.49  In federal court, plaintiffs have to serve 
defendants within 90 days of the filed complaint, whereas plaintiffs have 
120 days to serve in Mississippi state courts.50  This is an example of how, 
even though methods and procedures of services may vary to some extent 
across jurisdictions, there are a set of traditional and basic methods that 
are shared by Mississippi and federal courts, as well as other jurisdictions.  
When a defendant cannot be located to the extent that it would 
hinder the preferred in-hand service process or burden the plaintiff, the 
court has alternative methods of service in place for the particular 
situation to give defendants constructive notice, which is referred to as 
“substitute service.”51 A variety of methods for substitute service of 
process are described below that are authorized by certain jurisdictions 
that “may be sufficient to inform parties of the object of proceedings.”52  
Forms of substitute service vary throughout different jurisdictions, but 
they all have the same goal and purpose of giving the defendant a 
reasonable opportunity to have notice of the proceedings.53 Now that it 
has been established what is to be delivered and who is to deliver the 
summons and complaint, we will now discuss the different methods of 
serving the papers to interested parties. The following sections will 
 
  46. Id. (citing Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905); Blinn v. 
Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911)); See Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912)). 
  47. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-19. 
  48. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c); MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1). 
  49. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3). 
  50. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(h). 
  51. Substitute Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
  52. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1877). 
  53. Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill, The Free Dictionary, FARLEX, 
https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Service+of+Process (2005). 
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address and compare some of these more traditional methods and also 
discuss other evolving methods that Mississippi should adopt, such as 
social media service. 
 
D. Service of Process Through Social Media was First Introduced 
Internationally 
 
 Neither Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4 or Mississippi 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4 explicitly allow service of process 
through social media, but it has been authorized under Rule 4(f) in federal 
court and flexible notice provisions in other states. Rule 4(f) is the rule for 
serving an individual in a foreign country.54  The foreign individual that is 
to be served must be a competent person that is not a minor.55  The foreign 
defendant must be served in one of the following manners: 1) “by an 
internationally agreed means of service” authorized by the Hague 
Convention, 2) “if there is no internationally agreed means,” then by 
service authorized by the foreign country’s law, service directed by the 
foreign country’s court upon request, personal service, or service by 
certified mail, or 3) service by other means that are ordered by the court 
that are not prohibited by an international agreement.56  
The method of service of process via social media, such as “modes 
of electronic and online communications including email and social 
networking sites like Facebook,” was first introduced under Rule 4(f)(3).57 
In federal court, Rule 4(f)(3) is the rule that governs service of process of 
an individual in a foreign country that allows a method that is reasonably 
calculated to give notice “by other means not prohibited by international 
agreement, as the court orders,” leaving the proposed method of service 
up to the court to authorize as proper and constitutional.58  This rule gives 
rise to a catch-all provision that allows courts to authorize any means of 
service as long as it complies with due process.59  
The due process reasonableness inquiry standard set out in 
Mullane60 “unshackles the federal courts from anachronistic methods of 
service and permits them entry into the technological renaissance.”61 
 
  54. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3). 
  55. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). 
  56. Id. 
  57. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22084, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014).  
  58. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3). 
  59. St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, No. 3:16-cv-3240-LB, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 136152 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2016).  
  60. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. 
  61. Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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Courts can order any means of service under this rule as long as the 
method is reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the 
proceedings and must not be prohibited by international agreement.62  The 
international agreement does not have to explicitly authorize the proposed 
method of service; it just cannot prohibit it.63 The international agreement 
can simply be silent to the issue, which would allow courts to exercise 
their unfettered authority to choose an alternative mode of service, such as 
service by telex message,64 to be proper under the circumstances, like seen 
in New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & 
Transmission Co.65 Service via social media is not a “last resort nor 
extraordinary relief”66 method of service; it is merely one method of many 
that is used to serve process on an international defendant.67 A plaintiff is 
not required to attempt service through all other available means of 
service offered under Rule 4(f) provision before resorting to requesting 
social media service.68  The plaintiff simply has to show that social media 
service is reasonably calculated to reach the defendant under the 
circumstances of the case.  
Under Rule 4(f)(3), the court is allowed to tailor the method of 
service employed on an international defendant based on the specific 
circumstances of the case.69  For example, in FTC v. PCCare Inc., the 
plaintiff was proposing to serve the defendants that were located in India 
via email and Facebook for unpaid attorney fees.70  Even though some 
courts may require a show of attempted service through the other possible 
methods, “Rule 4(f)(3) may allow the district court to order a special 
method of service, even if other methods remain incomplete or 
 
  62. WhosHere, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22084, at *7. 
  63. New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & 
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
  64. The telex is an older “system of communication in which messages are 
sent over long distances by using a telephone system and are printed by using a special 
machine (called a teletypewriter).” Telex, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2015). 
  65. New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 495 F. Supp. at 81.  
  66. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016. 
  67. Id. at 1015. 
    68. FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1014-15 (“No such requirement is 
found in the Rule's text, implied by its structure, or even hinted at in the advisory 
committee notes,” “that Rule 4(f) should be read to create a hierarchy of preferred 
methods of service of process.”). 
  69. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22084, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014) (citing SEC v. Anticevtic, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11480, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2009)).  
  70. PCCare247 Inc., 2013 WL 841037, at *5. 
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unattempted.”71  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) proposed 
service by email, social networking site (Facebook), and publication, 
which publication was set as a last resort due to cost.72  The court found 
that service via email and Facebook as a “backstop” did not violate any 
international agreement, nor did they violate due process.73  
In PCCare Inc., service by email alone was held to comply with 
“due process [if] a plaintiff demonstrates that the email is likely to reach 
the [foreign] defendant.”74  The plaintiff demonstrated the authenticity of 
the email by establishing that the email accounts it had for the foreign 
defendants had been an effective means of communicating with the 
defendants, which was the case here because it was an internet-based 
business that communicated through email.75 However, Facebook was not 
able to stand alone as the sole method of service, but rather a 
reinforcement to service via email.76 
In PCCare Inc., the court held that, for service by Facebook to be 
the “only” means of service, there has to be substantial evidence “that 
would give the [c]ourt a degree of certainty that the Facebook profile . . . 
is in fact maintained by [the defendant] or that the email address listed on 
the Facebook profile is operational and accessed by [the defendant].”77  
Even though the FTC set forth enough facts to prove that it was likely the 
Facebook accounts were actually operated by the foreign defendants 
because the email addresses for the Facebook accounts matched the email 
addresses given to the plaintiff, and the Facebook accounts “list[ed] their 
job titles at the defendant companies as their professional activities,” the 
court did not feel that Facebook alone was enough to be adequate notice.78  
Due to the specific circumstances of this case, it was found to be a 
constitutional method of service because it was highly likely to reach the 
defendants by service of email and Facebook combined.79 If “defendants 
run an online business, communicate with customers via email, and 
advertise their business on their Facebook pages,” it complies with due 
process of law to serve the defendant by those same means.80 
 
  71. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1015. 
  72. PCCare247 Inc., 2013 WL 841037, at *3. 
  73. Id. at *5. 
  74. Id. at *4. 
  75. Id. at *4-5 (citing Williams-Sonoma Inc. v. Friendfinder Inc., No. C 06-
06572 JSW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31299, 2007 WL 1140639, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 
2007)). 
  76. Id. at *5. 
  77. Id. (citing Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80594, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012)).  
  78. Id.  
  79. Id. at *6. 
  80. Id.; Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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The courts were wading into the new uncharted waters of social 
media service, but they were cautious by finding these methods 
constitutional only when exercised as a backstop or “collectively.”81  Like 
seen in WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, the court found that “four means of 
service [collectively], two email and two social networking accounts 
ostensibly belonging to defendant, comport[ed] with due process.”82  This 
proves that courts knew that this new area of service was the most 
reasonable way to reach the foreign defendant, but their uncertainty of 
reaching the desired defendant with this particular method of service made 
courts ask for more than what was required of other traditional methods.  
For example, in a bankruptcy case in Georgia, social media service 
significantly helped a trustee having difficulty serving a foreign defendant 
that was moving from country to country.83  In Broadfoot v. Diaz, the 
foreign defendant was evading service by moving around and refusing to 
give the trustee any useful contact information.84 The only forms of 
communication the foreign defendant provided the trustee with was a 
“facsimile number and [an] electronic mail address, [which] indicated his 
preference for such methods of communication.”85 With the help of Rule 
4(f)(3) that gives courts the flexibility to authorize special means of 
service in particularly difficult cases, it was found constitutional to allow 
service via electronic email and fax, in addition to service by mail to the 
defendant’s last known address, because that was proven to be the foreign 
defendant’s preferred means of communication.86  This is an example of 
courts protecting themselves from the fear of breaching a defendant’s due 
process rights through authorized progressive means of service, such as 
email and fax, by allowing them collectively with a more traditional 
means of service. However, over time, courts have developed the 
principle that “[I]f any methods of communication can be reasonably 
calculated to provide a [foreign] defendant with real notice, surely those 
communication channels utilized and preferred by the defendant himself 
must be included among them.”87  
Even though courts were being cautious by requiring more when 
serving foreign defendants via social media to ensure constitutionality, 
situations eventually arose where social media service alone was enough 
 
  81. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22084, at *11 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014). 
  82. Id. at *11-12. 
  83. Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs.), 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 2000). 
  84. Id. at 718.  
  85. Id.  
  86. Id. at 720.  
  87. Id. at 721. 
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because it was the only available means. For example, in St. Francis 
Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, the plaintiff sued the defendant for relief and 
damages that were a result of the defendant’s financing a terrorist 
organization.88  The plaintiff struggled to locate and serve the 
international defendant, so the plaintiff requested the court to authorize 
service of process through the defendant’s Twitter account that had been 
used “to fundraise large sums of money for terrorist organizations.”89  
Because of the defendant’s active use of the Twitter account to 
communicate with other individuals, the court found this method alone to 
be proper because under these specific circumstances “service by the 
social-media platform, Twitter, was reasonably calculated to give notice” 
and was the “method of service most likely to reach” the defendant.90 
 Similarly, in Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, the court 
authorized service via email under Rule 4(f)(3) because the foreign 
defendant, an internet business entity, had “designated its e-mail address 
as its preferred contact information.”91 Unlike New England Merchs. Nat’l 
Bank, the foreign defendant in Rio Props., Inc. was an internet business 
entity that had neither an office nor a door- just a computer terminal.92  
The court found that if any method of communication was to be 
reasonably calculated to provide the foreign defendant with notice, then it 
must have been email, considering it was the method of communication 
the defendant utilized and preferred.93 With the defendant’s business 
being structured so that email was the only way to contact the defendant, 
the court was forced to adapt to the circumstances of the case and allow 
sole service via email to be constitutional.94 These are proper 
circumstances for the court to broaden the methods allowed under the 
constitutional principle and progress into the technological renaissance.95  
Different jurisdictions have authorized different methods of 
electronic and online service of process pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) because 
each court had to decide based on the circumstance of the case which 
method would most likely reach the defendant with notice, such as what 
particular form of social media was used by the defendant.96 Even though 
 
  88. St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, No. 3:16-cv-3240-LB, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 136152 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2016). 
  89. Id. 
  90. Id. at 5. 
  91. Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). 
  92. Id. at 1018. 
  93. Id.  
  94. Id. 
  95. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d 1007. 
  96. See, e.g., FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31969, 2013 WL 
841037, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 7, 2013) (permitting service by email and Facebook); In 
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service of process through social media started internationally, this 
method of service has progressed to be used not only on foreign 
defendants but also on domestic defendants under certain circumstances in 
jurisdictions that have evolved with advances in technology.  
 
E. Service of Process Through Social Media in the United States 
 
Over the past decade, social media has become a prominent part of 
many people’s lives to the extent that some jurisdictions are permitting 
service through social media as an alternative form of service on non-
foreign defendants.97 There is no provision authorizing social media 
service on domestic individuals under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure; however, it has been allowed by federal courts relying on state 
law under Rule 4(e).98 Federal courts have found a loophole to not only 
serve defendants by social media service on foreign defendants under 
Rule 4(f)(3) but also on domestic defendants by relying on service rules of 
a state under Rule 4(e)(1).99 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(e) is the rule for “serving an individual 
within a judicial district of the United States,” which allows service by (1) 
following state service rules of the state where the federal lawsuit is 
pending or where the defendant is served, (2) personal service, (3) 
dwelling and usual place of abode service, or (4) delivering service to an 
authorized agent.100  Under Rule 4(e)(1), the federal courts are further 
unshackled from being limited to the traditional methods of service of 
process. More specifically, Rule 4(e)(1) allows an individual that is 
competent and not a minor to be “served in a judicial district of the United 
States by following state law for serving a summons in an action brought 
in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district is located or 
where service is made.”101  This rule gives federal courts a window to 
authorize social media service when a state’s service rules permit it 
through a broad notice provision. 
 
re Int’l Telemedia Associates, Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) 
(authorizing service on defendant by fax and email address); Rio Properties, Inc., 284 
F.3d at 1016 (permitting service by email); Chanel, Inc. v. acheterchanel.com, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 115518, 2012 WL 3544844 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2012) (authorizing service 
of process by email). 
  97. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2015). 
  98. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 80594, 2012 WL 2086950 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).  
  99. FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).  
101. Id.  
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For example, in Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, the case was filed 
in federal court in the Southern District of New York, which pursuant to 
Rule 4(e), permitted the court to look to the service of process laws of 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308.102 Due to the domestic third-party defendant evading 
service, the third-party plaintiff, Chase Bank, requested the court to allow 
an alternative form of service via email and Facebook.103 Under N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 308, service can be made by (1) personal service, (2) delivery to 
“a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business, 
dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served” and 
mail, (3) service on an agent, or (4) so-called “nail and mail” service.104  
However, New York has a unique notice provision that allows service to 
be made “in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, 
directs” when the more traditional methods are impracticable.105 Unlike 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(f), this special New York provision “requires a 
showing of impracticability of other means of service” under the 
circumstances of the case.106  
In Fortunato, the facts of the case proved that all other means of 
service were impracticable because the domestic defendant was evading 
service. However, the court did not allow service via email or Facebook 
because the plaintiff had “not set forth any facts that would give the 
[c]ourt a degree of certainty” that the Facebook account or the email 
address listed on the Facebook account was operated and accessed by the 
domestic defendant.107  The court then settled to authorize the only 
alternative method remaining, which was service by publication in the 
area that the domestic defendant claimed to live on the Facebook 
account.108 Social media service was allowed in this jurisdiction, but for 
this particular case, it was not found constitutional because the plaintiff 
did not set forth enough facts to prove the domestic defendant controlled 
the email address or Facebook account.109 This is not always the case.110 
In Ferrarese v. Shaw, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York authorized service via email and Facebook 
as supplement means under Rule 4(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and McKinney’s CPLR (“CPLR”) Section 308(5) in New 
 
102. Fortunato, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80594, at *3. 
103. Id.  
104. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016). 
105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
107. Fortunato, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80594, at *7. 
108. Id. 
109. Id.  
110. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2015). 
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York.111  The plaintiff showed the other traditional means of service to be 
impracticable through numerous failed attempts to serve the defendant at 
her home address with a process server.112  The plaintiff even hired a 
private investigator to locate the defendant, but these efforts still failed 
due to the defendant continuously changing her name to evade service. 
Because the other means were impracticable and the defendant was 
evading service, the court authorized service via email and Facebook.113  
But the court held that the plaintiff did not put forth enough facts to prove 
the defendant actually controlled the email address and Facebook account, 
so the court allowed these alternative methods as “supplemental means”114 
to the valid method of service by certified mail with return receipt to the 
defendant’s last known address.115 Courts want to allow social media 
service, but they have not adapted to the advances in technology enough 
to let the progressive method of service stand-alone unless the particular 
situation of the case leaves the court no choice.  
The federal courts have not been “blind to changes and advances 
in technology.”116 The federal courts have adapted and evolved to accept 
social media service under circumstances that call for it. Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no specific provision that 
authorizes social media service, but there are provisions that indirectly 
allow it on foreign and domestic defendants. Federal courts can only 
authorize social media service on domestic defendants because some state 
laws have evolved to contain a catch-all provision that indirectly allows 
the courts to authorize it. Other states are keeping with the times and 
taking advantage of the advancements in communication through 
technology, particularly New York.  
In New York, the provision of the statute that allowed the court to 
authorize social media service was CPLR 308 (5), which permitted 
personal service upon a natural person be made “in such manner as the 
court … directs” if service is impracticable by in-hand personal service, 
service by dwelling or usual place of abode, and nail and mail service 
authorized by the statute.117  This provision gives the court the power to 
look at the specific circumstances of the case in question and decide 
 
111. Ferrarese v. Shaw, 164 F. Supp. 3d 361, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
112. Id. 
113. Id.  
114. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 715. 
115. Ferrarese, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 364, 368.  
116. Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002); Baidoo, 5 
N.Y.S.3d at 711. 
117. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016). 
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whether service via email, Twitter, Facebook, fax, etc., would be much 
more likely to reach the defendant than service by publication.118   
For example, in Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, the plaintiff wife wanted 
to serve her husband divorce papers through Facebook direct message 
because she did not know the contact information nor the whereabouts of 
the defendant to serve him properly through any other method of 
service.119 This is one of those cases that leaves the court no choice but to 
allow social media service, unaccompanied by traditional means, to be a 
valid method of service because no other means is possible. The plaintiff 
easily demonstrated the alternative means to be impracticable because all 
three forms of service require knowledge of the defendant whereabouts.120 
The defendant refused to make himself available for service as well as 
failed to provide a fixed address or place of employment.121 Once the 
plaintiff demonstrated that the other alternative means were impracticable, 
the plaintiff had to set forth evidence that the defendant was the Facebook 
account holder to satisfy constitutional principles.122 
 To silence the central concern of whether the method by which 
the plaintiff seeks to serve a defendant comports with the fundamentals of 
due process by being reasonably calculated to provide the defendant with 
notice of the divorce, the plaintiff was required to submit a supplemental 
affidavit to prove the Facebook account belonged to the defendant.123 The 
court found the copies of communication exchanged between the plaintiff 
and defendant over Facebook messages, along with verification of the 
defendant’s photos, to be enough to persuade the court that the account 
belonged to the defendant.124 After meeting the burden of demonstrating 
that it would be impracticable to serve the defendant by any of the other 
more traditional means of service and that service by Facebook was 
constitutional, the court “ventured into uncharted waters” and authorized 
service via Facebook direct message alone.125  
Similarly, in Hollow v. Hollow, the plaintiff wife was attempting 
to serve her husband, who had moved to Saudi Arabia via email pursuant 
to the same expansive notice provision offered in the New York CPLR 
308(5).126 A defendant moving to a foreign country does not “relieve a 
 
118. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (citing Dime 
Sav. Bank of N.Y. v. Mancini, 169 A.D.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)). 
119. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 712. 
120. Id. at 712.  
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 714. 
123. Id. at 715. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 712-13. 
126. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (Sup. Ct. 2002). 
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plaintiff of her obligation to make a reasonable effort to effectuate service 
in a customary manner before seeking relief” under N.Y. CPLR 308(5).127 
The plaintiff made reasonable efforts to effectuate service both through 
Interserve, which is an international process server, and through the 
defendant’s employer.128 With the other alternative methods proving to be 
impracticable, the plaintiff proposed service via e-mail considering this 
was the only form of communication the defendant used to communicate 
with the plaintiff and his children.129 
Because the “Constitution does not require any particular means of 
service of process,”130 e-mail in this particular case complied with due 
process because it was reasonably calculated to provide notice since e-
mail was the defendant’s preferred method of communication. To settle 
the court’s concerns about the difficulty of verifying the defendant’s 
receipt of the e-mail, it authorized service via e-mail, along with service 
by international registered air mail and international mail standard, to 
satisfy the due process requirements.131 Courts are not replacing any 
traditional methods of service with social media service; courts are simply 
adding this progressive method to increase the likelihood of reaching 
defendants in difficult cases.  
Parallel to the catch-all provision provided in the New York 
statute, New Jersey has a similar provision, N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:4-
4(b)(3), that authorizes social media service.132 This New Jersey service 
rule states, “[A]s a tertiary and last resort, if service cannot be made by 
any of the modes provided by R. 4:4-4, any defendant may be served as 
provided by court order, consistent with due process of law.”133 In K.A. v. 
J.L., the plaintiff requested to serve the defendant via Facebook 
messenger under this New Jersey service rule.134 The defendant initially 
contacted the plaintiff through Facebook and the plaintiff’s adopted son 
through Instagram.135 Because the diligent efforts to serve the defendant 
with injunction were exhausted through unsuccessful personal service and 
publication, the court found social media service by Facebook account to 
 
127. Id. at 706. 
128. Id. at 707. 
129. Id. at 705. 
130. Id. at 707 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314 (1950)). 
131. Id. at 708 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). 
132. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3). 
133. K.A. v. J.L., 161 A.3d 154, 157 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016) (citing N.J. Ct. R. 
4:4-4(b)(3)). 
134. Id. at 156. 
135. Id.  
2020] SERVICE OF PROCESS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA 329 
be sufficient notice.136 The court did not require as much evidence proving 
the authenticity of the Facebook account because it was the exact account 
the defendant employed to contact the adopted son and gave rise to the 
action for an injunction.137 In difficult cases where contact with the 
defendant is minimal or primarily through social media, courts need to 
have the freedom to authorize service that would more than likely reach 
the defendant to give the plaintiff relief through constitutional means.  
 
F. Methods of Service of Process Used in Mississippi Under Rule 4 
 
Now that social media service has been shown to be constitutional 
under certain circumstances, this Article proposes that Mississippi Rules 
of Civil Procedure Rule 4 should be amended to include a provision that 
would authorize it. Similar to the McKinney’s CPLR 308(5) provision, 
the proposed amendment will be a catch-all provision that allows 
plaintiffs to request a method of service, such as social media service, 
when the more traditional methods are impracticable. If Mississippi 
amends Rule 4, this would help ease the difficulty of serving defendants 
who cannot not be located or who are evading service by the traditional 
means offered under Rule 4.  
The statutory provisions of Mississippi authorize many of the 
same traditional methods of service that have been discussed for 
individual defendants.138 Mississippi courts authorize the following 
methods of service of process: (1) in-hand service of process by a process 
server or sheriff, (2) service at dwelling or usual place of abode, (3) 
service by first-class mail, (4) service by publication, and (5) service by 
certified mail on persons outside the state.139 The proposed amendment 
would only allow plaintiffs to request social media service when in-hand 
service, service at dwelling, and service by first-class or certified mail 
were attempted or found to be impracticable. The circumstances of each 
case dictate what method of service is practicable. The following sections 
will address and compare the traditional methods of service offered under 
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4 that would have to be proven 






136. Id. at 159. 
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138. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4. 
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1. In-Hand Service 
 
 In-hand service within a jurisdiction is the “gold standard” method 
of service of process because it is the form of notice that is adequate in all 
types of proceedings, which has always been considered constitutional.140  
In-hand service, also known as personal service, is considered actual 
notice because someone actually hands over written notice of the lawsuit 
to the defendant in person.141  Mississippi courts allow “delivering a copy 
of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally or to an 
agent authorized by appointment of by law to receive service of 
process.”142 This method of service is the optimal way to deliver a 
complaint because it is direct and less disputable that service of process 
occurred.143 But, this method of service is not always the easiest to 
execute because it requires that the plaintiff filing suit to have knowledge 
of the defendant’s whereabouts.144  Even though in-hand service is 
preferable, it is not required.145  
 In Mississippi courts, delivery of copies of the summons and 
complaint must be made by a process server or the sheriff of the county in 
which the defendant resides.146 The process server can be any person that 
is 18 years or older and who is not a party in the lawsuit.147 For a service 
to be made by a sheriff, the party seeking service has to make a written 
request to the court to appoint a sheriff to serve the individual 
personally.148 The language of Mississippi’s Rule 4 requires that personal 
service cannot be made with reasonable diligence before moving on to 
another method such as abode or dwelling service.149 Therefore, a plaintiff 
has to show that reasonable efforts were made to serve the defendant via 
personal service before resorting to service on a relative at the dwelling 
place.150 If reasonable diligence is proven in the failed attempt to serve an 
individual personally, then the process server or server appointed by the 
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court can move on to the next substitute method of service if 
circumstances warrant it, such as dwelling and abode service. 
 
2. Dwelling or Usual Place of Abode 
 
In the event the address of the party the plaintiff desires to notify is 
unknown, one form of traditional substitute service of process that is 
acceptable in Mississippi is “leaving a copy of the complaint and 
summons at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode” in the 
hands of someone that is of “suitable age and discretion who resides 
there.”151 This form of substitute service is a constructive form of notice 
because the court presumes that the defendant will have knowledge of the 
suit if the service is delivered to a resident at his dwelling.152  
 In Mississippi, there are two steps for the process server or sheriff 
to successfully serve the defendant at their usual place of abode: (1) 
“leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the defendant’s usual 
place of abode with the defendant’s spouse or some other person of the 
defendant’s family above the age of sixteen years who is willing to 
receive service and (2) by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and 
complaint” to that same residence by first class mail.153 The person who 
serves the defendant is still a process server that is 18 years or older and 
not a party or a sheriff appointed by the court upon the plaintiff’s 
request.154 The detail in the statute that says spouse or other family 
ensures that the court is focusing on the dwelling or abode to be 
considered the defendant’s “home” or “residence.” 
Because it is presumed that a resident of suitable age and 
discretion will notify the interested person of the suit, “direct service upon 
a person is not necessary when service is made at that person’s home with 
another resident present.”155  Even though the particulars of age and other 
small details may change from one jurisdiction to another, the general 
“rule authorizing dwelling house service of process comports with due 
process.” 156 If due diligence is exercised through repeated efforts to serve 
a person that resides at the individual’s dwelling place and these efforts 
fail, then another method of sending the papers to the individual’s 
dwelling is acceptable, such as service by mail service.157 
4. Service Via Mail 
 
151. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(B). 
152. Rentz v. Swift Transp. Co., 185 F.R.D. 693, 697 (M.D. Ga. 1998). 
 153. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(B). 
154. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(c). 
155. Farm Credit Bank v. Stedman, 449 N.W.2d 562, 564 (N.D. 1989). 
156. Id. (citing 62 AM. JUR. 2D Process § 99 (1972)). 
157. Estate of Waterman v. Jones, 46 A.D.3d 63, 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
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 Mississippi courts allow service of process through registered mail 
to the defendant’s postal address to be a sufficient form of notice.158 The 
process server sending “notice by mail may reasonably be relied upon to 
provide interested persons with actual notice of judicial proceedings” 
which complies with due process of law.159  
 In Mississippi, service may be served upon a defendant by mail on 
any class of “individual[s] other than an unmarried infant or a mentally 
incompetent person” or “a domestic or foreign corporation.”160 These 
classes of defendants can be served “by mailing a copy of the summons 
and of the complaint (by first class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to 
be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgement … 
and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender.”161 In this 
jurisdiction, “service by certified mail on a person outside” of Mississippi 
is also an authorized method of service.162 The important aspect of service 
by mail on both in state and out of state defendants is the fact that both 
require some form of “certified” or “registered mail” to ensure that the 
defendant was notified before any final judgments were rendered against 
them.163 
Different jurisdictions have different laws for substitute service, so 
it is imperative to check the law of that jurisdiction before deciding what 
method of service to employ.164 Some jurisdictions willingly allow this 
method of service when other methods are ineffective because notice by 
mail is “inexpensive and efficient.”165  Even though some jurisdictions 
freely allow this method, other jurisdictions limit this method to only 
allowing service via mail on out of state defendants.166  However, when 
the address or location of a defendant is unknown or service by mail was 
refused by the defendant, courts will likely resort to a more inefficient 
means of service, service by publication. 
5. Publication Service 
 
158. Registered Mail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
159. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982); Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 
317, 321 (Miss. 1987) (noting that, “Without doubt, Rule 4(c), Miss.R.Civ.P., prescribes 
in the alternative several constitutionally permissible methods of effecting service of 
process . . . .”). 




164. Service of Process, MARKELL & ASSOCS., INC., 
https://www.markellegal.com/our-services/service-of-process/.  
165. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982). 
166. Cent. Insurers of Grenada, Inc. v. Greenwood, 268 So. 3d 493, 502 (Miss. 
2018). 
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Publication is a constructive form of notice that is usually a last 
resort.167  Publication service is “where the summons is printed in a 
newspaper designated by the court and which can be granted upon 
showing that ‘service cannot be made by another prescribed method with 
due diligence.’”168  This form of service is constructive because the 
defendant will be assumed to have knowledge of the proceedings because 
it will be in public record.169 
In Mississippi, if it is proven after diligent inquiry that the plaintiff 
or petitioner does not know the postal address of the defendant, then the 
clerk “shall promptly prepare and publish a summons to the defendant to 
appear and defend the suit.”170 The service by publication will appear in 
the newspaper of the county where the proceedings are pending once a 
week for three successive weeks.171 In the event that the county does not 
have a newspaper, then the notice will be attached to the courthouse door 
of the county as well as be published in an adjoining county’s 
newspaper.172 The court assumes this method to be effective whether the 
defendant reads the notice or not because the information is publicly 
displayed in the newspaper via publication.173 
Although service by publication has been accepted as a 
constitutionally permissible method of service,174 its constitutionality 
should be questioned because there are now other methods of service that 
are substantially more likely to give the defendant notice including social 
media service. Because this method of service is very unlikely to be seen 
and costly, some jurisdictions have begun to allow other methods of 
service to be authorized by the court, such as social media service.175  
All the traditional methods of service discussed above are methods 
that are commonly used in other jurisdictions, so Mississippi should 
follow other progressive jurisdictions by adding a catch-all provision. 
Under Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no 
progressive notice provision, as seen in the New York and New Jersey 
statutory provisions, or case law that gives the court freedom to authorize 
an alternative form of service, such as social media service, when the 
traditional methods are impracticable.176  This is a provision that 
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Mississippi should consider amending Rule 4 to add because it would 
increase the likelihood of defendants sufficiently receiving notice, which 
is the key principle in determining the constitutionality of methods of 
service. 
 
III. MISSISSIPPI SHOULD ADOPT A SERVICE OF PROCESS RULE THAT WILL 
ALLOW SERVICE VIA SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
In 2017, 81 percent of the United States population had some form 
of a social media account.177 The The increase in the population’s use of 
social media and internet sources opens a whole new opportunity for more 
efficient service of process. Service of process via social media was first 
introduced under the flexible notice provision Rule 4(f)(3), which 
authorizes service “by any means not prohibited by international 
agreement, as the court orders.”178  Service of process via the internet and 
social media is one of the most efficient ways to serve an individual in a 
foreign country depending on the specific facts of the case, time, and 
money.  The language of the statute gives the court the power to allow any 
means of service that it sees as constitutional and reasonable, including 
social media service.179  
A form of this catch-all provision giving courts the power to allow 
“any means”180 was adopted in some states in the United States.181 For 
example, both New York and New Jersey’s service rules contain a catch-
all provision for difficult cases that their traditional methods of service 
authorized are impracticable.182  In the New York notice provision, CPLR 
308 (5) authorizes personal service upon an individual to be made “in 
such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if service is 
impracticable under paragraphs one [in-hand service], two [service to 
 
177. Clement, supra note 6. 
178. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).  
179. See, e.g., FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 31969, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 7, 2013) (permitting service by email and 
Facebook); Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs.), 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2000) (authorizing service on defendant by fax and email address); Rio Properties, 
Inc., 284 F.3d at 1016 (permitting service by email); Chanel, Inc. v. acheterchanel.com, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115518, 2012 WL 3544844 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2012) 
(authorizing service of process by email). 
180. See, e.g., PCCare247 Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31969, at *3-4 
(permitting service by email and Facebook); Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 720 (authorizing 
service on defendant by fax and email address); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016 (permitting 
service by email); Chanel, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115518 (authorizing service of 
process by email). 
181. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016). 
182. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016). 
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dwelling or usual place of abode] and four [nail and mail service] of 
[CPLR 308] section.”183 This provision gives courts the power to accept 
any means of service that they find appropriate under the circumstances of 
the case, including service via social media.  
Giving courts this freedom leads to a more efficient way to 
increase the chance that a defendant will actually receive notice. With the 
whole purpose behind service of process being to give the defendant 
adequate notice, Mississippi should follow this trend and expand the rules 
of service of process to give courts the power to include service through 
social media for the purpose of increasing the likelihood that a defendant 
actually receives notice. 
 
A.  Proposed Amendment to Mississippi Service of Process Rule 
 
 The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure were first adopted 
effective January 1, 1982, which included Rule 4 regarding process and 
was later amended again in 1982 and 1984.184  Amendments are “the 
process of altering or amending a law or document.”185 These alterations 
are made to improve an existing law when circumstances arise that were 
not thought of when the law was originally formed. Amendments to the 
law ensure its ability to remain relevant and flexible to the issues at hand. 
In order for the courts to be modernized, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
should request the Mississippi Rules Advisory Committee draft an 
amendment similar to McKinney’s CPLR 308(5) that is specifically 
tailored to Mississippi’s Rule 4.  
Courts across the country are “adapting with the times” and taking 
steps to maximize the effectiveness of notice through the use of social 
media.186  If other courts and states are evolving, then Mississippi should 
do so also in order to give parties in a lawsuit the advantage offered by 
other courts. The times are changing with the advancements in 
communication through social media. Seven out of ten adults in American 
use at least one form of an internet social networking service with 
 
183. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711 (Sup. Ct. 2015). 
184. Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317, 319 (Miss. 1987). 
185. Amendment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015). 
186. Wade v. Furmanite Am., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00169, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
75624, at *23 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2018) (quoting Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., No. 14–
CV–03074–CMA–CBS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205079, at *6 (D. Colo. Apr. 28, 2017) 
(“The Court agrees that electronic notice through social media platforms is particularly 
appropriate for classes comprised of largely young, largely transient unnamed plaintiffs, 
because email addresses and physical addresses may not provide a reliable, durable form 
of contact.”)).  
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Facebook being the most popular.187  The recognition of this vastly used 
method of communication should signal the court’s attention and compel 
them to take advantage of it.  
The proposed amendment to Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 4 should be a catch-all provision for specific situations that give the 
court the power to determine what means of service would be the most 
effective in actually providing the defendant notice of the suit. The desired 
amendment would add a provision similar to that provided in New York 
under CPLR 308 (5) which authorizes effective notice “in such manner 
that the court directs, if service is impracticable under the traditional 
methods of service listed in the statute,”188 which gives the court the 
inherent power to decide what is the more potent or appropriate process 
under the circumstances.189  This provision is to give the court authority to 
allow other means of service when it is impractical to use other alternative 
methods. The proposed provision is a catch-all because it is the back-up 
plan for very specific circumstances that an alternative form of service, 
such as service via social media, is more likely to reach the defendant than 
traditional means. 
The language of the proposed amendment will be crafted from a 
combination of the flexible notice provisions provided in the New Jersey 
and New York service rules.190  The provision would add to the current 
rule as follows: “(6) by court order. If service is impracticable under 
sections (c) then: (1) by process server pursuant to section (d), (2) by 
sheriff pursuant to section (d), (3) by mail, or (6) service by certified mail 
on person outside state, then any defendant may be served as provided by 
court order, consistent with due process of law.” This provision is 
proposed to be placed last under section (c) as the catch-all provision. 
However, service by publication is not included in the list of methods that 
have to be proved impracticable because the futile means of service by 
publication should be the last resort when no other means, such as social 
media service, are available.  
With the United States having a high percentage of people on 
social media, it is likely that an appropriate way to serve a defendant 
would be social media over publication.191  The language of “served as 
provided by court order” in the proposed provision opens the doors to give 
Mississippi courts the power to authorize service through social media if 
the court determines under the circumstances that it is a more effective 
 
187. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
188. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 711. 
189. Bloodgood v. Leatherwood, 25 So. 3d 1047, 1050 (Miss. 2010). 
190. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016). 
191. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 
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means to actually give notice. The “court is vested with the inherent 
power to promulgate procedural rules” under certain circumstances when 
dealing with a particular class of missing or service evading defendants.192 
This amendment would be to give freedom to the court to decide whether 
to approve a motion for service by social media only after due diligence 
has been proved.193 
This proposed provision is not altering the traditional methods of 
service offered under the Mississippi Rules of civil Procedure Rule 4. It is 
simply giving courts another last resort method to choose from in order to 
ensure justice for missing defendants under certain circumstances. Social 
media service has already been proven constitutional, when the specific 
facts of the case allow it, so now Mississippi courts need a provision that 
authorizes this method of service. With social media service being 
constitutional and the proposed amendment proven to work in other 
jurisdictions, the Mississippi courts should incorporate this method into its 
statute because Mississippi should adapt and evolve to benefit the 
potential defendants who are desired to be reached. 
 
B. Reasons Mississippi Should Adopt a More Flexible Provision to 
Include Service of Process Through Social Media 
 
If “the constitutional requirements of service of process are notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections,”194 then why should two forms of notice such as 
mail and publication be allowed “[when] it will doubtless never be 
seen?”195  Since notice, circumstances, and opportunity to be heard are the 
sole focuses of the constitutional requirement of service of process, how 
can one say that their efforts to give notice were made in good-faith196 and 
reasonably calculated to provide notice if something is doubtful to be 
seen? If a court has more options than the traditional methods of service 
that would be more likely to reach the defendant under certain 
circumstances, such as service via social media, then it should be given 
 
192. Bloodgood, 25 So. 3d at 1050 (citing Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 76 
(Miss. 1975)). 
193. Goetz v. Synthesys Techs., Inc., 415 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2005). 
194. K.A. v. J.L., 161 A.3d 154, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016) (citing Mullane v. 
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (internal quotations 
omitted)).  
195. Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317, 322 (Miss. 1987). 
196. Sanders v. Robertson, 954 So. 2d 493, 496 (Miss. App. 2007) (“Sanders 
next argues that he made a good faith effort to serve Robertson but could not do so 
because he could not locate her.”). 
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the authority to make that determination and allow the method most likely 
to give a potential defendant the opportunity to defend himself. 
Even though “a probably futile means of notification is all that the 
situation permits” to be considered constitutional notice when a person’s 
location is unknown, the courts should still use the method that is most 
likely to reach the defendant if one is available.197 For example, in the 
United States Supreme Court, the court denied service by publication 
because the defendant’s address was known making service by mail an 
available method.198 In Schroeder v. City of New York, the court asserted 
that if there was a better method of service available, then it should trump 
the alternative.199  If service by mail trumps publication, then surely 
service by e-mail should also. Service by publication is only 
constitutionally acceptable “because it [i]s no more likely to fail to give 
actual notice than any other method that the legislature could possibly 
prescribe,” especially when dealing with missing defendants.200 This is no 
longer the case with advances in technology because now there is social 
media service that legislature could prescribe that would trump 
publication.  
If there are other means available that would more likely reach the 
potential defendant than other traditional means, then that alternative 
method, such as social media service, should be implemented in order to 
comply with due process. “The determination of due process requires the 
balancing of ‘the vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its 
fiduciaries to a final settlement’ against ‘the individual interest sought to 
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”201 Amending the rules to 
add another back-up plan that gives courts the freedom to approve 
alternative methods of service based on the circumstances of the case will 
only improve the defendant’s likelihood of receiving notice while 
protecting the defendant’s right to be heard under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Addition of a flexible notice provision would protect a 
defendant’s due process rights because the court would be allowing all 
efforts to get notice to a defendant, which would result in a constitutional, 
good faith effort.  
Mississippi courts should never lose focus of the purpose of 
notice, which is to give the defendant the opportunity to be heard, and 
service of process is used to accomplish notice. With the main focus being 
 
197. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).  
198. Greenbaum, supra note 31.  
199. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213 (1962). 
200. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 782. 
201. K.A. v. J.L., 161 A.3d 154, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016) (citing Mullane, 339 
U.S. at 314-15). 
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to give the defendant the opportunity to be heard, the court should have 
the freedom to decide what method is most likely to accomplish this 
standard goal. If means have to be that of attempting to actually inform 
the defendant, then a court allowing service by publication rather than 
another more pragmatic means, such as social media service, would not be 
truly desirous of actually informing the defendant.202 One actually 
desirous of informing the defendant would have chosen a different method 
to increase the likelihood of actually informing the defendant.  
The court should be able to choose from all its possible resources, 
not just the traditional, old fashioned methods, so an amendment is 
necessary to expand the courts’ options. For example, if an individual has 
a set of tools and none of the tools in their toolbox would effectively fix a 
certain problem, they could use duck tap (publication) even though this 
quick fix is not the most efficient method. If there was a tool that had 
evolved and would help accomplish the simple goal of giving notice to a 
missing defendant, then why would the individual not add the tool to their 
toolbox. Similarly, Mississippi should amend Rule 4 to add a broad notice 
provision, so courts have all the tools to ensure that a defendant gets a 
sufficient, good-faith effort in attempting to notify them of the 
proceedings.  
Aside from being more constitutional by choosing the most 
adequate method from all possible resources, another benefit social media 
has to offer includes “relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for 
communications of all kind.”203  Courts should utilize this benefit. One of 
the most common complaints with any interaction with the judicial system 
is the expenses that come alongside it. As shown in Joe Hand Promotions, 
Inc. v. Shepard, the plaintiff complained that he ‘“exhausted all of 
standard means by which [he] [could] serve the defendants . . . and [has] 
incurred great expense in doing so.’”204  
Publication and paying for postal services to serve a defendant can 
become costly when it takes “multiple attempts” to serve someone in 
order to show that the plaintiff did their due diligence in attempting to 
notify the defendant.205 For example, in Mullane, notice by mail was 
alleged to be more effective in getting notice to defendants than 
publication because mail was recognized as an efficient and inexpensive 
means of communication that did not put an unnecessary burden on 
 
202. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. 
203. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
204. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Shepard, No. 4:12cv1728 SNLJ, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 113578, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2013). 
205. Goetz v. Synthesys Techs., Inc., 415 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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plaintiffs.206  With social media being an even more efficient and 
inexpensive means of communication than mail, surely it should be more 
effective than publication. If there is another method available that is 
speedier, less costly, and possibly more effective in providing the 
defendant with notice, then the court should take this method into account 
when determining what method is reasonably calculated to give notice.  
Another reason Mississippi should amend Rule 4 is that, if courts 
are allowing social media into courts as evidence and e-signatures to form 
contracts, then why not evolve to allow service of process through social 
media as well. If a “[c]ourt concludes [a plaintiff] may employ its 
proposed electronic signature method for execution of consent forms,” 
then why vary from this general practice of allowing electronic and 
internet-based methods, evidence, and contracts into court.207 If 
Mississippi courts are willing to determine the outcome of a case based on 
evidence from social media, as seen in Smith v. State, then a plaintiff 
should be allowed to simply serve a defendant through the same means.208  
With the times changing and social media becoming more present in 
proceedings, it is time to amend Rule 4 to adapt and evolve for the benefit 
of potential defendants as well as the efficiency to the judicial system. 
Mississippi not adopting a more flexible provision that would give 
courts the power to authorize service of process through social media only 
puts defendants at a disadvantage. If all we care about is giving adequate 
notice to defendants so that they have the opportunity to be heard, then 
Mississippi should include service of process though social media to 
increase the chances of defendants actually receiving notice.209  
Mississippi needs to adapt to the advances in communication for the 
benefit of potential defendants.  
 
C. The Negatives of Service of Process Through Social Media 
 
 One major drawback courts consider regarding social media 
service is the uncertainty that the person on the other end of the internet is 
actually the person the plaintiff desires to serve. This central drawback is 
the main reason social media service has been held to be unconstitutional 
in some cases. As seen in Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, the court’s 
 
206. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. 
207. Wade v. Furmanite Am., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00169, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
75624, at *24 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2018) (citing Dyson v. Stuart Petroleum Testers, Inc., 
308 F.R.D. 510, 518 (W.D. Tex. 2015)); Aguirre v. Tastee Kreme #2, Inc., No. CV H–
16–2611, 2017 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 83327, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 2017). 
208. Smith v. State, 136 So. 3d 424 (Miss. 2014). 
209. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 
(1914)).  
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concern that “anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or 
incomplete information” prevented the court from being able to confirm 
the authenticity of the defendant’s social media account.210 
It is true that people commonly steal other individuals’ identities 
over the internet, and plaintiffs can never be 100 percent sure that they are 
actually communicating with the defendant they desire to give notice to. 
The inability to confirm the authenticity of the account marks the method 
of service unconstitutional because the court cannot reasonably find that 
notice will reach the defendant when they do not reasonably trust that the 
account belongs to the desired defendant. However, in some cases, 
plaintiffs have set forth enough facts that provided courts with a degree of 
certainty in regard to the authenticity of the social media account, 
rendering it a constitutional method. Even though the “concerns over 
authentication arise because anyone can create a fictitious account and 
masquerade under another person’s name or can gain access to another’s 
account,”211 there are ways to check Internet Protocol addresses212 as well 
as checking the activity on the social media accounts to make sure it is the 
person that the plaintiff actually desires to reach.  
Mississippi has a standard to prove the authenticity of Facebook 
messages to permit them to be entered into evidence. In Mississippi, such 
evidence is sufficiently authenticated when: 
 
“. . . the sender admits authorship, the purported sender is 
seen composing the communication, business records of an 
internet service provider or cell phone company show that 
the communication originated from the purported sender’s 
personal computer or cell phone under circumstances in 
which it is reasonable to believe that only the purported 
sender would have access to the computer or cell phone, 
the communication contains information that only the 
purported sender could be expected to know, the purported 
sender responds to an exchange in such a way as to 
indicate circumstantially that he was in fact the author of 
the communication, or other circumstances peculiar to the 
 
210. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 80594, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (citing Smith v. 
State, 136 So. 3d 424 (Miss. 2014)). 
211. Smith, 136 So. 3d at 432. 
212. IP Address, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/ip_address (An 
Internet Protocol address, “or simply an ‘IP,’ is a unique address that identifies a device 
on the Internet or a local network.”). 
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particular case may suffice to establish a prima facie 
showing of authenticity.”213 
 
This rule was provided in Smith where the defendant argued that the court 
erred in admitting several Facebook messages into evidence because it 
was not proven that the defendant controlled the Facebook account.214 
Even though there was not enough evidence set forth in this particular 
case, there are cases that have, and will, set forth evidence substantial 
enough to prove the authentication of the defendant’s ownership of the 
account.215  For example, enough set of facts were set forth in Baidoo216 
and K.A. v. J.L.217 that would have met the requirements set out in 
Mississippi’s authenticity rule. 
The standard provided in Smith, proves that Mississippi is 
accepting of social media evidence when there is enough evidence to 
prove the defendant is the true owner of the social media account.218  
The same requirements to prove authenticity for social media evidence 
can be used to prove the identity of a defendant for social media service. 
If courts are willing to determine the outcome of cases with the high risk 
of finality based on social media evidence, then courts should allow social 
media service to simply kick the lawsuit off.  
Though there will always be some uncertainty, the uncertainty of 
not reaching the desired person via social media is similar to the 
uncertainty of service by publication. With service of process by 
publication, the uncertainty of actually getting a defendant notice is just as 
great, if not greater. The uncertainty of not reaching the desired person is 
an issue that is present in all alternative methods that are not personal 
service. This uncertainty is not enough to not allow service via social 
media.  
Another drawback for many courts, as well as Mississippi courts, 
is that allowing social media service is asking courts to “venture into 
 
213. Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433. 
214. Id.  
215. Id.  
216. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714 (Sup. Ct. 2015).The court 
found the copies of communication exchanged between the plaintiff and defendant over 
Facebook messages, along with verification of the defendant’s photos, to be enough to 
persuade the court that the account belonged to the defendant. 
217. K.A. v. J.L., 161 A.3d 154, 159 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016). The court did not 
require as much evidence proving the authenticity of the Facebook account because it 
was the exact account the defendant employed to contact the adopted son and gave rise to 
the action for an injunction. 
218. Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433.  
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uncharted waters without the guiding light of clear judicial precedent.”219 
Many jurisdictions are uneasy about stepping out of their comfort zones 
and permitting nontraditional methods of service. However, the State of 
New York has always been a trendsetter, and New York’s acceptance of a 
flexible provision that permits social media service is a trend that all 
jurisdictions, including Mississippi, should follow. Just because there is 
no judicial precedent guiding the decisions to allow social media service 
does not mean it is wrong. If everything new or different was considered 
to be wrong, then the courts would never grow and evolve to benefit the 
efficiency of the judicial system.  
 
D. The Expansion to Include Service Through Social Media Carries More 
Positive Weight Than Negative 
 
  The benefits of social media service to defendants outweighs the 
potential drawbacks. The main focus of service of process is to give 
defendants notice of an action, so they can defend themselves. Service of 
process through social media can be more effective than other means of 
service in certain situations, so courts should be given the freedom to 
choose means that are more effective, such as service via social media.  
 The circumstances and facts of each case trigger what method of 
service is practicable for that particular situation. For example, if the 
circumstances show that the defendant desired to be notified can be 
located or the address of the defendant is known, then service in-hand, by 
dwelling or usual place of abode, or by mail are all permitted.220 However, 
when the circumstances include a defendant that is a nonresident of the 
state, cannot be found after diligent inquiry, or whose post office address 
is unknown after diligent inquiry, then the circumstances would permit 
service by publication.221 If the circumstances show that the defendant is 
located outside of Mississippi, then the plaintiff can choose service by 
certified mail for convenience, rather than taxing themselves with other 
more invasive methods.222 The circumstances of the case are the basis for 
what makes the court find a method of service sufficient. Advances in 
technology have created circumstances that would make social media 
service the more pragmatic method, such as situations where the 
defendant is evading service, cannot be located, or the lawsuit was 
initiated over the internet or social media. Because of advances in 
communication creating circumstances that make social media service the 
 
219. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 713. 
 220. MISS. R. CIV. P. RULE 4(c)(1-3). 
 221. MISS. R. CIV. P. RULE 4(c)(4). 
 222. MISS. R. CIV. P. RULE 4(c)(5). 
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more efficient method, the Mississippi Supreme Court should adapt and 
request an amendment to add a more flexible provision to authorize social 
media service to give relief to these specific situations. 
 Service via social media is more efficient because plaintiffs do not 
have to waste time and money searching for a defendant, paying a process 
server to make multiple trips to a residence, or paying for publication that 
is costly. The efficiency of being able to find defendants faster on the 
internet and social media is a benefit that would make service of process 
more efficient and less costly. These benefits outweigh potential 
uncertainty that one might have with regards to the right person being the 




 For notice to be constitutionally sufficient, the method of service 
must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appraise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action.”223  With emphasis on 
“reasonably calculated,” it is questionable how courts consider service of 
process though publication or certified mail when a defendant’s location is 
unknown to be “reasonably calculated” when there is a whole other 
universe of communication being underutilized. The times have changed 
with eight out of ten people on Facebook and 81% on some form of social 
media. The technological advances have opened up a new set of cheaper 
and faster sources of communication, and courts should take advantage of 
this.  
All the traditional methods of service authorized under 
Mississippi’s Rule 4 are traditional because they are commonly authorized 
in other jurisdictions, so if other jurisdictions are expanding their methods 
of service, then Mississippi courts should follow to evolve and be more 
efficient. The Mississippi Supreme Court should follow other progressive 
jurisdictions, such as New York and New Jersey, by adding a flexible 
notice provision to Rule 4. Mississippi should adopt this flexible notice 
provision to give its courts the power to allow service of process through 
social media under certain circumstances, so a court may fairly determine 
what is reasonably calculated from all the available resources. 
Conforming to the use of technology and social media as an alternative 
method of service will only improve the likelihood that the defendant 
receives notice and, therefore, better comply with the constitutional 




223. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982). 
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